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MARY M. CAMERON Florida Atlantic University

CONSIDERING DALITS AND
POLITICAL IDENTITY IN IMAGINING
A NEW NEPAL
In this article I examine the articulation between contexts of agency within two kinds of discursive projects involving Dalit identity and caste relations in Nepal, so as to illuminate competing
and complimentary forms of self and group identity that emerge from demarcating social perimeters with political and economic consequences. The first involves a provocative border created
around groups of people called Dalit by activists negotiating the symbols of identity politics in
the country’s post-revolution democracy. Here subjective agency is expressed as political identity
with attendant desires for social equality and power-sharing. The second context of Dalit agency
emerges between people and groups as they engage in inter caste economic exchanges called riti
maagnay in mixed caste communities that subsist on interdependent farming and artisan activities. Here caste distinctions are evoked through performed communicative agency that both resists
domination and affirms status difference. Through this examination we find the rural terrain that is
home to landless and poor rural Dalits only partially mirrors that evoked by Dalit activists as they
struggle to craft modern identities. The sources of data analyzed include ethnographic field research
conducted during various periods from 1988-2005, and discussions that transpired throughout 2007 among Dalit activist members of an internet discussion group called nepaldalitinfo.

Waiting
In the last week of November in 2006, forty-one
years after the United Nation’s General Assembly
adopted for ratification the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD 1965), thirty-five years after
His Majesty’s Government of Nepal ratified it, six
years after the National Human Rights Commission
was established by mandate of the 1997 Nepal
Human Rights Commission Act, four years after the
Nepali government established the National Dalit
Commission, and one week after the landmark
peace agreement between home-grown Maoist rebels
and the Nepali government, a Dalit woman sat alone
on the familiar steps outside a Thakuri home in far
western Bajhang district of Nepal.1 Through the
clear night air Durga could hear from the third floor
kitchen above her the slapping sound of fresh wheat
dough and the clinking of heavy silver bracelets, as
the Thakuri family’s eldest daughter-in-law prepared
the evening meal of roti and vegetable curry. It was
a cold evening, and a late autumn wind blew down
from Khaptad Lekh. The figure on the steps hugged
her bony legs closer to her chest and tightened the
threadbare shawl around her thin frame. Her meal
that evening would not begin until she returned

home with the salt and spices she was now awaiting
from the landlady. “Ama” I called to her. “Aren’t
you cold? Why is she taking so long?” As she had
for so many years, through four children and nine
grandchildren, the now elderly widow beseeched
her Thakuri patrons inside the house to “have pity
on me, I have so little at home to eat and I want
to cook my potatoes with some salt and turmeric.
Please give me only a small handful of salt and a
piece of turmeric root.” Decades of sewing clothing
and repairing shawls for the landowning family, first
alongside her husband and then with the elder two
of her three sons, had earned her the right – she
hardly considered it a privilege – to ask the wealthy
Thakuri landowners for help in times of need such
as she experienced this night. But the obligatory
waiting that was the customary sign of subservience
for so-called lower castes seemed only to get longer,
in spite of government proclamations that caste
discrimination must end and that those who violated
Dalit rights would be brought to justice. In spite
of national laws, Durga herself witnessed recent
incidents when Dalit students were barred from the
local high school activities involving the worship of
Saraswati, the goddess of learning. Durga wondered
how those people - the young and defiant Maoist
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followers with their bright red scarves and flapping banners
who until recently had assembled in the once-active school
yard near her Dalit community - were ever going to help her.
She could not dream of seeing changes so great in her lifetime
that she would be free from being a lower status person, a juto
manche (impure person), a nachhune manche(not touchable
person).
Two months later in the new year of 2007, in the capital city
of Kathmandu and in small and large cities around the world,
a related discussion was underway, a debate among Dalits
about who they are, what they should be called, and whether
to relinquish or to retain those symbols attached to their Dalit
status. Durga, of course, did not participate, and indeed, was
only partially a subject of their discussions, focusing as they
did primarily on men’s concerns. Yet she lived in the kind
of place the discussants often evoked when referring to the
persistence of caste discrimination in Nepal, namely, the
rural farming communities to which urban Nepalis often
point as reservoirs of conservative, non literate and backward
conditions. I will suggest in this article that activists’ struggle
over Dalit identity politics in Nepal’s new democracy might
be challenged to include other agencies of resistance found in
the lived experiences of rural Dalits like Durga, specifically
in the context of economic transactions that daily frame
their lives. My point is not to refute the legitimacy of Dalit
activists’ claims as they craft modern political identities.
Rather, I wish to show how these claims only partially mirror
the complexities of rural Dalits’ agency of resistance within
a socioeconomic context that must be considered in finding
paths to social justice in the new Nepal.

Locating Borders
In this article I use an analytic trope of boundary to draw
out the relationship between two kinds of discursive domains
involving Dalit identity and caste relations in Nepal, so as
to illuminate potentially complimentary forms of agency that
emerge from demarcating social perimeters with political
consequences. Although the social worlds discussed are
in reality more fluid than is suggested by the heuristic tool
of framing and bounding, the political activists engaged
in social transformation and the rural farmers engaged in
trade strategically channel semi-fixed social distinctions
into culturally relevant categories offered by the participants
themselves, only to then contest them. Thus framing is both a
tool of constructing and of dismantling, by Dalits and by the
anthropologist.
The first is a provocative border created around groups of
people called Dalit by activists dynamically negotiating the
symbols of identity politics in the country’s post-revolution
democracy. Here subjective agency is expressed as political
identity with attendant desires for social change and for power.
The second framing, also a fluid social one, emerges between
people (like Durga) and groups as they engage in inter caste
exchanges called riti magné in mixed caste communities that
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subsist on interdependent farming and artisan activities. Here
caste distinctions are evoked through communicative agency
that both resists domination and affirms status difference.
Recent debates among Dalit activists focus on the merits of
assigning the label “Dalit” to a heterogeneous group of people
that shares a history of being discriminated against socially,
politically, economically, and religiously by those who are
unlike them in social status. The discussions I will draw
from took place primarily among Dalit members of a Yahoo
internet group called nepaldalitinfo that is, according to its
description, “run by a group of Dalit intellectuals and friends
of Dalits of Nepal” (http://www.nepaldalitinfo.net). Non
Dalits are also members of the discussion group, but they did
not significantly participate in this particular discussion. All
those quoted in this article are Nepali Dalit activists in the
caste reform movement either inside or outside of Nepal, and
have asked that their real names be used.
It is not surprising that consensus on the merits of
strategically promoting the term Dalit would be difficult for
the community to reach, for there is variation in the lives
of so-called untouchables. Dalits, who comprise anywhere
from 12- 25% of Nepal’s population, are geographically
spread throughout the country with a large majority living
in rural communities.2 Their diverse artisan skills on which
the agrarian economy depends have separate and unique
histories, with differing potentiality in the contemporary
world; for example, village demand for handmade leather
shoes made by Sarkis has dropped precipitously with the
availability of mass-produced footwear from China, Nepal
and India, while artisan products made by basket weavers
(storage granaries) and ironsmiths (agricultural tools) have
not yet been replaced by market products. Dalits themselves
engage in relative degrees of ranking based on ritual purity
(Cameron 1998; Parish 1996), a small minority has become
highly educated in national and foreign institutions, and
there is uneven sharing of knowledge about what other
Dalits are experiencing, particularly for people living in rural
areas.3 Finally, and for our purposes here, those involved in
the debate over political identity agree on who the oppressors
are, but they disagree on what the basis of that oppression is
(Religious? Political? Economic?). Therefore they find it difficult
to agree on the means by which to eliminate the conditions
of oppression, particularly in relation to powerful symbols
like Dalit, as this case shows. Using the label “Dalit” keeps
alive the meanings associated with caste discrimination, and
is politically efficient, but it is nonetheless a denotation that
is unacceptable for some activists. They seek an alternative
language that more accurately reflects who “Dalits” in fact
are.
The second set of boundaries I examine involves the social
perimeter of mutual obligations negotiated around and
between people as they initiate and engage in inter caste
exchanges called riti magné in rural mixed caste communities
that subsist on interdependent farming and artisan activities.
Using ethnographic data culled from field research in Bajhang

over the past nearly twenty years, I will discuss forms of power
that Dalits have developed in their interactions with BrahmanChhetris. Here the demarcations are less predetermined
than they are the contingent outcome of morally-informed
human interaction that is strategic, informative, intimate,
deceptive, degrading, empowering, and enduring -- in other
words, complexly communicative. In examining riti magné
interactions and exchanges, we find the rural terrain that
is home to landless and poor Dalits only partially mirrors
the rural sites evoked by Dalit activists as they struggle to
craft modern identities. Instead, an “ethnography of the
particular” (Abu-Lughod 1991) that I present here finds that
mixed caste relations are more complex than is suggested
by the dichotomy of a modern, caste-free urban site versus a
caste-dominated rural one. The modern world may impinge
poignantly on urban people and result in new struggles for
negotiating and framing the moral self in Nepal (Liechty
2002; McHugh 2004). However, negotiating the moral terms
of Dalit political identity in post-revolutionary Nepal involves
a different set of inclusive values that seeks liberation for all
Dalits and that therefore should include forms of rural agency.
The challenge for activists is how to incorporate what Lauren
Leve (2007) has identified for Nepali rural women activists
as ‘mutual obligations’ that help to define the self, and in
the case of Dalits, I suggest, that encompass obligations and
expectations that serve as anchors of agency and sites of
political transformation.

The Future in Contemporary Nepal
Events of late in Nepal suggest that there is no period like
the present when Dalits, who have been dehumanized by
the words in religious books, who are oppressed by people
in their communities, and who remain virtually unprotected
against discrimination by the state’s ineffective criminal
justice system, might imagine a better world than the one
they have known for perhaps centuries. The current period
is one of hope and potential. As lawmakers in Kathmandu
for the past year have calculated community representational
proportions, group prerogatives, legislative seats for urban and
“backward” regions, and the proportion of representation by
Dalit and janajatí leaders, the exchange of ideas has become
invigorating. Turning to one arena of such exchanges, this essay
considers how closely the now globally circulating discourse
on Dalit identity in the new democracy fits with the lived
experience of Dalits in rural agrarian Nepal, particularly their
economic dependence on non Dalits of higher caste status. In
crafting modern identities, the slippage between these two
sites – the reified world of global discourse among activists
and educated elites, and the everyday life of subsistence
farmers – results, I suggest, from the modern requisite that
identity be bounded, exclusive and stable in a form unfamiliar
to the culture of Nepal. Moreover, Dalit political identity
must arise from a moral ground that includes all Dalits,
rural and urban, and this is difficult to achieve within the

environment of powerful ideologies such as modernity and
development that are widely circulating in the country, that
influence activists’ agendas, and that tend to devalue rural
life as somehow removed from progress. As we will see, Dalit
activists struggle over what their identity is, at this time and
place in Nepal’s history, when new directions are being forged
that finally address centuries of social injustice. Dalit struggle
is not, however, a new phenomena; what I hope to show is
how oppressed castes in rural communities, too, have evolved
moral calculations and communicative strategies that allow
them to challenge domination and cultivate self-respect in
culturally acceptable ways. What should be acknowledged,
therefore, is how the modern struggle for a casteless society
that is the Dalit political agenda circulating in one internet
debate, finds a well-used adaptive strategy of resistance to
domination that nonetheless remains a ‘hidden transcript’
(Scott, 1990).
Rural village inter caste exchanges I consider are typically
initiated by Dalits who request material goods from
Brahman-Chhetri providers. Such requests are a common
form of patterned interaction between people whose families
and lineages have been connected for several generations.
The practice locally is called riti magné, which translates as
asking, begging, requesting, or soliciting from a landowning
and so-called high-caste person according to “tradition”
(riti).4 With little exception, the solicitor is poor (landless or
nearly so) and visits the wealthier landholding family’s home
– to whom the term riti is extended as a name - to request
food necessities such as rice, wheat, and corn, spices such as
chili, turmeric and salt, nonessential goods such as cigarettes,
tobacco, tea leaves, and sugar, or a cash loan. What I find is
that such inter caste transactions suggest manifold cultural
ideas at work in cultivating the needs and desires of givers and
receivers. What transpires in riti magné is a communicative
strategy with contours similar to those described by James
Scott on maneuvers of resistance by lower status persons
to gain advantage in achieving a goal while preserving self
dignity (Scott 1985; 1990). Thus, defining Dalit as either
an essential set of characteristics or as a condition involving
an on-going process of discrimination, as we will find
happens in negotiating modern Dalit political identity, both
fall short of acknowledging forms of Dalit resistance such
as demonstrating equal to superior moral understanding of
community obligations, thus justifying forms of shaming and
work delays, all of which challenge caste stratification and
weaken the hierarchical structure in rural communities.

Contesting “Dalit”
The anti-monarchy Maoist insurgency in Nepal created a
coalition of groups around an ideology that promised, through
armed revolution, to deliver social justice by eliminating the
power of internal (mainly royalists and Brahman-Chhetri) and
external (mainly Indian) “imperialists.” The role Dalits have
played in the Maoist insurgency is unclear, but there is an
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unverified assumption that because the movement espouses
eliminating caste and other forms of discrimination, Dalits
comprised many of the cadres. Bajhangi friends tell me that
Dalits are involved in the Maoist movement there, but not
in sizable numbers and that in fact Thakuri and other elite
castes represent the majority of Maoists.
I turn here to the discourse of Dalit identity politics as the
activists attempt to craft their relationship to symbols and as
those symbols are debated, negotiated, and contested by an
internet community called nepaldalitinfo. The list was founded
by Dr. Drona Rasali four years ago and has approximately
330 members, mostly educated Nepali women and men from
predominantly Dalit groups, though not exclusively (there
are several non Nepalis as well as non Dalits who are active
members). Though the debate over the use of the term Dalit is
not new to nepaldalitinfo and to NGOs working to eradicate
caste discrimination in Nepal (some discussants on both
sides say they have debated this term “over a hundred times”),
the discussion over the past year was stirred by the hardfought and real possibility that the term “Dalit” would appear
in Nepal’s new Constitution. Indeed, the interim and yet to be
ratified Constitution mentions Dalits in item 6 of Part 3 under
“Fundamental Rights and Duties”:
vi. All types of exploitation-oppression including untouchability of the Dalits shall end, and special rights shall be ensured for
the Dalits in all sectors.

And Part 11, item 3 under the “Constituent Assembly” states:
3. Women, oppressed nationalities, Dalits, the disabled etc.
shall be included in the Constituent Assembly in proportion to
their population. (Interim Constitution of Federal Democratic
Republic of Nepal, 2063)

As the internet discussion deepened, several key
understandings of Dalit members about their community’s
history emerged. Some discussants argued that the global
circulation of the term Dalit and its political acceptance in
South Asia are particularly powerful reasons to retain its use.
It should be noted that however globally recognized the term
Dalit may now be, it is relatively new to Nepal, having achieved
wide circulation only in the past decade, even though it was
first introduced to Nepal by India’s most famous untouchable,
Dr. B.R. (Babasaheb) Ambedkar, one of the chief architects
of the Constitution of India (Zelliot 1992) and founder of
the Republican Party of India (later to become the Bahujan
Samaj Party), when he visited Nepal in early 1956. A decade
later in 1967 it was used in the name of the first organization
in Nepal to address Dalit issues, Rastriya Nepal Dalit Jana
Vikash Parishad. Still, the term Dalit is unfamiliar to people in
many rural communities in Nepal, though as communication
about caste issues spreads through the country people are
being introduced not only to the word but to its meaning and
connotations. I met numerous members of so-called lower
castes in Bajhang and Dailekh who even in the year 2000
were unfamiliar with the term Dalit. Nonetheless, use of the
term Dalit to refer to a group of people with a stigmatized
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social status is common among many social welfare and
government organizations, for the label facilitates efficient
political organizing and certain actions to be taken on Dalits’
behalf, including numerous social justice programs. Indeed,
one list member was concerned that donor agencies would
cease contributing to their cause if there was no identifying
and unifying symbol associated with the oppressed group.
And without doubt the recent historical appointment of two
Dalit leaders from the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and
the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) to
the 13-member Council of Ministers is evidence of a national
leadership consensus on the special circumstances of Dalits
and the need for their group to be more integrated into the
political structure. The latter decision by Prime Minister Girija
Prasad Koirala was met with enormous enthusiasm and relief
by the members of nepaldalitinfo, and demonstrated to them
the political power of unity under one symbol. These should
be seen as welcome signs of albeit cautious progress, for the
process of Dalit representation on the Constituent Assembly,
in sharp contrast to the ministerial appointments, is currently
drawing criticism on nepaldalitinfo, as is discussed briefly
later.
Advocates for retaining the label Dalit argue several points.
First, the term is regarded as a symbol of pride of heritage
rather than of scorn (or at least should be adopted in that
spirit), which efficiently unifies under one label different
groups of people with similar histories of oppression. The
legacy it captures is vividly rendered in the literal meaning
of Dalit, to be broken or downtrodden. Use of the word Dalit
as part of one’s identity is a bold statement of the unique
oppression groups of people have experienced (and in fact
four Newar jaat have, through a spokesperson, publicly
rejected the application of the term to them), thus making
their identity unlike other minorities in Nepal. And finally,
the term Dalit is beginning to be nationally and globally
recognized. Although not all advocates agree with all these
points, they all fully support the inclusion of the term Dalit
in the Interim Constitution as they consider their group to
be unlike other minorities such as janajatí.5 In defense of the
term, one long-term Dalit activist provides a history of the
adoption of the term in Nepal.
In this regard we have had so many discussions with Indian
Dalit intellectuals and leaders including Babu Jagjivan Ram.
From all these discussions what we came to know is that the
word Dalit is the only word which can address in one word to
all the victims of caste discrimination for centuries. Some of
our intellectuals have said it has been imported from India. It is
right, many things are imported from India including foods and
culture, because we are an open border. Truly when Dr. Baba
Saheb Ambedkar came in Nepal on 1956 and had important
discussions with the Dalit leaders of Nepal, since then the word
Dalit was used to address this community.
- Om Prakash VK Gahatraj (aka Om Prakash VK), February
23, 2007

National and international non government organizations
(INGOs and NGOs) in Nepal, of which there are perhaps
thousands, have been relatively slow in identifying Dalits as a
group that should be assisted in reversing the many negative
effects of centuries of discrimination. The history and politics
of this significant oversight, while a worthy topic of research
and analysis, is not addressed here. However, following the
restoration of democracy in 1990, many such organizations
have been founded, so many in fact that at least two
federations of Dalit NGOs (DNGOs) have been formed to aid in
organizing, communicating, fund raising, and facilitating the
development of projects among the various NGOs addressing
Dalit issues. Leaders of these two federations estimate there to
be between 700-1000 registered Dalit NGOs in the country of
Nepal, as well as one government Commission (established in
2002).6 In addition to these are a hundred more NGOs that,
while not specifically mentioning Dalits as their mission,
nonetheless develop on an ad hoc basis projects and programs
specifically targeting Dalit communities. The international
donor agencies that financially support the work of DNGOs
include Danida/HUGOU (Denmark), DFID/ESP (England),
USAID, SNV (Netherlands), Norad (Norway), CCO Canada
(Canadian Embassy), Finnish Government, GTZ (Germany)
and UNDP. The role of international aid is identified by some
activist discussants as an important consideration in crafting
a politically relevant identity. In response to those who feel it
is important to pay attention to what might appeal to donor
organizations, Mr. Om Prakash VK, Chairman of the Centre
for Dalit and Rural Development in Kathmandu, offers a
different perspective. He strongly urges that Dalits not feel
dependent on donors for social change, and to understand
that the term Dalit will not be in place forever. Mr. Om
Prakash VK, though, does argue for using the term Dalit and
to seeing its value particularly in the present time:
We are not thinking donors will support here for [a] long time.
They are not our main components. They are very, very temporary. It is [the] nation whom we are targeting and dealing with
permanently. The nation has cheated us for hundreds of years.
It has to give us compensation to overcome the condition of
Dalit. Dalit word is not a caste, it is a condition …we are facing
due to caste discrimination for hundreds of years. The word minority can not address this community. In one side we are not in
minority in comparison to other groups of castes, in other side
there are other minority groups in non Dalits who have also
good access in national resources. Again I want to inform to our
intellectuals that we have no hobby to write the word Dalit forever. We have no personal interest in this word. But this word
has now taken a strong position inside and outside especially
through communication which is helping us to make our path
easier for struggle for human rights. If the condition Dalit is no
more we will no more write Dalit. Presently a bright signal is
seen after People’s Movement-II to overcome this problem, so
please do not disturb to this line of possible achievement in this
crucial time, because hundreds of Dalit leaders have worked for
decades in Dalit movement. It is now time we are expecting to
get remarkable result for the sake of Dalits.
- Om Prakash VK, February 23, 2007

Retaining the word Dalit thus points to the condition of
discrimination, and does not signify one’s family identity or
one’s subjectivity. Rather it is a corrupt social condition that
the term in fact points to, not to a shameful state of selfhood.
As the discussion proceeds, participants list many causes and
sources of the condition of discrimination. Several key factors
of discrimination are enumerated by Ramu Bishwokarma, a
doctoral student in sociology at the University of Maryland,
College Park:
The underpinning causes, as it appears to me are -- lack of education, lack of income, lack of good health, lack of political and
social empowerment, just to name few. Until and unless we are
completely able to treat these causes, the disease of castiesm
which have named as “Dalit” will still be there in our society,
no matter whether we like it or not.
- Ramu Bishwokarma, February 23, 2007

Opponents of using the term Dalit, while not disagreeing
with the shared history of oppression or with the results of
united political activism, believe that the term is a shameful
one that perpetuates and reinforces the boundaries of
exclusion, rather than ultimately eradicating them. For them,
the term Dalit is a modern political version of a centuries-old
practice in which boundaries have become ever more rigid.
The impurity associated with a learned artisan skill came
to be more concretely denoted in the allegedly forced use of
occupation as the last name for groups who were primarily
artisans and small owner cultivators, thus obscuring birth
names associated with one’s clan and lineage to the point
where they are often unknown to women, and recalled by
men for marriage matchmaking purposes only. Two on-line
discussants express strong objections to the use of the term
Dalit, due to its association with a history of oppression and
to how that oppression was shaped from the very religion
they and others practice
When someone calls DALIT [emphasis in original], I feel humiliated no matter how qualified I am. This humiliation will
be there for forever for our generations to come if we do not
eliminate this word now. A doctor, an engineer, a scientist, a
teacher, no matter who we are, we are tagged as DALIT. I think
everyone, from their heart, should now think at this time not
to make any mistakes at this critical time which will make our
generation shameful forever.
- Prakash Nepal, May 9, 2006
I do dislike the term “Dalit.” It comes across like a gali [insult] to
me. No one is born Dalit. We are made to be Dalit by so-called
upper class and they did so by using the very religion we practice. They cheated us. We have a responsibility to educate our
people, [the] upper-class, and the world that they oppressed us
by using the religion we practice. In my opinion, by describing
yourself “Dalit” you are propagating the belief the other side
forced upon us and accepting your position in the society.
- Dr. Ramesh Sunar, February 21, 2007
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Dr. Sunar goes on to point out that international recognition
of the term Dalit does not necessarily justify its use, and like
others on the list, he notes that the word harijan, adopted
by Gandhi to refer to India’s untouchables, today has
produced little positive outcome for the lower castes in India
(a disputable observation for some; what is not disputable,
though, is that Indian Dalits dislike the term harijan, which
translates as “children of god” and which for many implies
a bastard birth). The long term goal of equality for future
generations is only possible by eliminating the word, as stated
by one discussant who points out the problem of creating a
false and misleading dichotomy:
Dalit title/word is contradictory to our goal to create an equal,
free, honored and dignified society. Because it will divide the
society into two groups forever – non-Dalits and Dalits, which
is not our vision.
- Krishna Sob, March 1, 2007

As the symbol disappears, so goes the stigma. And the
symbol will disappear only by abandoning its use and
embarking on a unified effort to fight for one’s rights, and
not by fighting to establish a false dignity around the term
Dalit, or any other terms such as oppressed, untouchable, or
harijan. Thus, a modern idea of rights must replace an ancient
idea of stratified jat. Dr. Sunar suggests alternative names for
the political action group, such as Samanta Sena or Samaj
Sena, as he says “some other name that you find appropriate
for our struggle that has no association with intolerable words
[like Dalit] that are mentioned above.” (Dr. Ramesh Sunar,
February 22, 2007)
In one very interesting post, the suggestion is made that
stigmatized occupational names – called “dead bodies” - be
replaced by thar (clan) names that denote important kinship
meanings with no stigma.
We are fighting a long cultural and social war. It’s not easy to
get rid of everything right now. If we keep improving in the
way we are thinking (out of the box), things will improve,
too. For example, all of us still remember that [the surname]
Bishwakarma was not there thirty years ago. Once Hira Lal
Bishwakarma became Minister, everyone from that community
started writing Bishwakarma. … Eventually, we are all human
beings and we should have the freedom to write what we want.
There is no harm in writing different names. Why should we
stick to «Sunar» or «Pariyar» or «Bishwakarma» which are not
even our Thars? We have our own Thars. We should have a free
mentality to write as our last name, for example, Baral, Paudyal,
Gautam, and so on.
- Prakash Nepal February 22, 2007

Thar or clan names may be similar to or the same as
Brahman-Chhetri thar names, groups that in fact sometimes
use them as surnames. The extent to which Dalits in the past
used thar names is unknown, though the forced replacement
of thar names with occupational names in the past may
be assumed to result from their uncomfortable identity to
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Brahman-Chhetri thar names. Still others have adopted the
non stigmatized surnames Nepal, Nepali, and Biswakarma
(alternatively Bishwakarma or Bishwokarma, translated
as “workers and skilled artisans” and the “God of workers
and skilled artisans”)7, and some nepaldalitinfo discussants
strongly advocate using these surnames.
Intended to symbolize a history of discrimination, the term
Dalit conjures for many an essentialized identity in opposition
to a dominant other, elite caste groups. Those who support
retaining the term Dalit advocate for this distinction as it
reflects an historical reality. However, added to the dangers
already noted by its dissenters is the term’s monolithic and
homogenizing tendency. As Abu-Lughod (1991) discusses
about the culture concept’s hierarchical tendencies, the term
Dalit likewise may obscure other forms of difference within
the social environment (such as gender and class), and may
overlook the connections between individuals and groups
on either side of the divide (such as values of amity and
cooperation, as will be discussed below). The discourse and
practice of economic transactions between different caste
groups to which we now turn illustrates well the complex
relations between people of different castes. Dalits have
evolved forms of resistance suitable to social circumstances
that draw on values other than rank, including communitybased mutual obligations

Riti magné: Interdependence, Rank
and Dalit Resistance in a Subsistence
Agrarian Economy
The interactive dynamics of riti maagnay results in part from
social ranking in Bajhang that allocates differential status
to people based on gender, age, and caste, and that expects
the fulfillment of responsibilities and behaviors that follow
therewith. This ranking practice was recently admonished
by the founder of nepaldalitinfo, Dr. Drona Rasali, when he
identified the significance to Dalits of a customary Nepali
practice that permits and even encourages inquiry of one’s
social position in a variety of ways, finding in the practice the
roots of domination:
We must revolt … against those people in Nepal who at the first
instance of meeting will not initiate conversation without asking anything other than “Kasma?” “Ke Thar?” “Ke Ma?” [literally
Which? What clan? On what? These are general questions that
ask for a reply about one’s status situation]. One tends to ask
the other person “Kasma?” with the corrupted mind to explore
if he could somehow dominate the person he is meeting for
the first time. This happens even among Baahuns, or Chhetris.
This mindset is imbedded deep in every Nepali. Because he is
brought up that way. He or she is brought up to see ‘high’ and
‘low’ in every thing around him or her. We all know but may
not realize how serious is the Nepali problem of finding ‘low’
in others.
- Dr. Drona Rasali, May 15, 2007

Dr. Rasali links the behavior of determining rank to the
desire to dominate, rather than as an expression of the need
for respect from others. While neither an essential quality of
being Nepali or Hindu, nor a totalizing social phenomenon
(ala Dumont; see Appadurai 1988), Dr. Rasali nonetheless
observes a practice that contributes to social injustice and
lost opportunities, effecting large numbers of people. The
result is layers of power and purity abounding in Nepali
human and deific life, compelling people to try to know the
relative value of individuals, families, and gods. Following
Dr. Rasali’s point of how inequality is maintained in Nepali
society, the riti maagnay interactions described here are a
common economically-based arena in which Dalit agency
expands the discourse of social value beyond simple caste
distinctions of high and low, to include community-based
moral responsibility, respect for the appropriate timing of
actions, and ethical generosity.
Landless Dalit artisan families in Bajhang are connected to
landowning Brahman-Chhetri families through economic
interdependence in which artisans provide products and
labor to landowners. Brahman-Chhetri lineages over the
generations have amassed wealth in land through historical
processes that have excluded Dalits, a process intensified in
the modern period with the human and natural erosion of
arable land (Cameron 1998). Today Dalits exchange their
artisan products and services with owner cultivators who
regularly provide harvest shares and are expected to meet
many other material and consumption needs of their Dalit
dependents. Harvest payments from landholding families
to landless Dalit families serve as the economic and moral
backbone of the inter caste relationship as these flow from
the established right of each family to ask for services, food,
or cash loans from the other in time of need.8
In this section I focus on two kinds of non-ritual requests: the
semiannual solicitation of khalo (harvest shares), and everyday
requests described in the opening paragraphs. What is evident
is that both ranking and reciprocity are present throughout
the interaction; riti magné is not a pure form of power and
subservience, nor is it solely a conventional reciprocal
exchange between status equals common to agricultural
economies elsewhere. Certainly it is the case that riti magné
is partially structured by codes of caste-based conduct; but in
practice, magné is an encounter in which the community values
of mutual reciprocity, friendship, cooperation, and dharma
(religion, religious duty) are strategically and persuasively
manipulated by both parties in achieving their respective
goals. In such seasonal and everyday requests, the complex
social boundaries separating Dalits and Brahman-Chhetris
are infused with potential for future exchange and with
ambiguity as to relative status. Although economic inequality
brings the two parties together in mutual interdependence,
it is the Dalit’s cultural adroitness at engaging an ethos of
cooperation that intermittently undermines a caste-based
hierarchy of difference.9 Thus, riti magné transactions expose
the special relational dilemmas encountered by Dalits in rural

settings.
In the kinds of everyday and seasonal interactions that are the
focus here, Dalits deploy strategies that resist the domination
explicit in being excluded from temples, water taps, and the
interior of elite castes’ homes. Brahman-Chhetri, on the other
hand, seek to retain their position of dominance during the
transactions by forcing subservient behavior from Dalits,
making them wait for long periods for the requested items,
criticizing their behavior, and insisting on labor in return.
Riti magné incorporates the commonly-held beliefs about caste
differences that include relative service to others (Dalits give
more), relative wealth (Dalits have less), and relative social
status.
Of the many scholars writing on caste in India, Gloria
Raheja’s work takes the practice of inter caste material
transactions most seriously (Raheja 1990). Her work, while
exhaustive and scholarly, contains two omissions that I have
addressed more fully elsewhere (Cameron 1998). Briefly,
she analyzes the ideology of upper-caste Gujar landowners
thoroughly but neglects to discuss and analyze lower caste
beliefs about what transpires in a transaction, in spite of the
fact that lower castes dyadically figure into her models of
centrality and mutuality. Nor does her analysis address nonritual transactions, focusing instead on transactions between
Gujars and others in ritual contexts alone. In one of her final
chapters of The Poison in the Gift Raheja develops a model of
mutuality based on data from harvest payments, wherein
a kind of fictive kinship relationship supports the ethos of
mutual transactional relations. However, this fictive kinship
is never confirmed by Dalits, about whom we might wonder
if they accept fictive family ties with status unequals. In
Bajhang, similar transactions do not create a model of fictive
kinship. Rather, the ethos supporting agricultural and artisan
interdependence, as described below, includes inherited rights
and responsibilities to non kin families, religious values of
meritorious behavior, and community values of cooperation
and generosity.
Drawing from the insights of Pierre Bourdieu on practice
theory, customary material exchanges between castes—and
in particular the language by which they transpire—are
analyzed here as speech acts in which Nepali artisans and
farmers actively deploy cultural models, normative rules,
social disposition, and linguistic strategies, to build a ‘sense
of the exchange game’ between status unequals (1977;
1990). The patterned regularity of word, gesture, voice, and
outcome indicate shared cultural models, while the dynamic,
constitutive quality of the exchanges points us past structure
to the strategic, agentive subjectivity of creative linguistic
performance. Thus, when we look perfunctorily at riti magné
encounters, we find that domination is explicit, and results
from Dalit economic deprivation and community Hindu
beliefs about the relative purity of persons. If we look closer
at the cultural context of magné, however, we find that Dalits
resist domination by those of upper caste.10 Social boundaries
are erected and contested on a daily basis, the meanings of
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which are “co-constructed by participants, emergent from
particular social interactions” (Ahearn 2001, 111). The
dialogic and performative dynamics of the magné context are
strategically manipulated and controlled by its interlocutors
- the landowner and the landless, the non Dalit and the
Dalit – ultimately to achieve pragmatic outcomes that meet
subsistence needs for the one and guarantee a labor source
and the merit of giving for the other.
Khare describes the refutation of domination as «subtle,
discrete, and even partially masked by subservience»
(1984), a theme taken up by James Scott in his wellknown comparative studies of discourses and techniques
of resistance to social domination (1985; 1990). Dalits of
eastern Nepal are described by Folmar as often following a
path of masking their identity in what he calls the “politics
of anonymity” where the identity of Dalit is what is hidden
for fear of injury or insult, and replaced with a different clan
name or a different jaat altogether (Folmar this issue, p. 17).
Folmar and I are both describing what to Scott and Khare are
refutations of domination that are enacted in forms «suitable
to social circumstances», suitable because they are created
from a shared cultural model yet performed in such a way
that may go unacknowledged by those in power.
The Dalits I have spoken with in Bajhang, Dailekh,
and Kathmandu Valley about their experiences of being
subordinated explain that while they abhor the treatment
they receive, nonetheless they feel they can assert (albeit
temporary) power to regulate their relations with elite castes,
in traditional contexts such as riti maagnay, in modern
development projects, and in the rare but increasingly
acceptable professional contexts of inter caste interactions
(Cameron 2008, forthcoming; Cameron and Rai 2000).
What Dalits control in the riti maagnay relationship is in
the broadest sense the relationship itself, as it sustains
a particularly poignant appearance of necessity born of
economic interdependence – Dalits as laborers for BrahmanChhetri.
What distinguishes riti magné from other types of social
interaction in Bajhang? First, it is not simply gaf, informal
and spontaneous conversation or gossip. Instead, riti magné
is one part of the agricultural cycle in Bajhang in which most
community members participate as receivers and givers of
products produced locally and used for subsistence. It is
enacted on the stage of decades-long social and economic
relationships, and keeps in motion on-going expectations
of labor and material exchange rooted in a non capitalist
economy. An economic transaction at its base, it is also a
social arena of consequence to Dalit well-being in which
social knowledge, artisan competence, and family productive
reliability all factor into the negotiation of present boundaries
and future expectations. Second, riti magné is not random,
though it may appear so, as it is initiated by one party with
little prior notice to the other. Indeed, riti magné is obligatory
due to the economic dependency of landless Dalits on
landholding Brahman-Chhetris.
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Finally, riti magné involves communicative strategies
deployed by Dalits to realize their goals while minimizing
the subservient position high caste owner cultivators confer
on them. These include selecting auspicious days to make
requests; using gestures and symbols of subservience and
dominance; engaging in mutually enjoyable conversation about
family, crops, politics, and village events; mixing pleading
and indignant tones; minimizing the amount requested;
and shaming the riti if generosity is not forthcoming. These
strategies convey shifting messages of denial, acceptance,
resistance, compromise, friendship, and finally, satisfaction.
Dharma, Karma and Dukha
Commonly translated simply as religion, the local meaning in
Bajhang of dharma or dhamma is dutiful action that produces
religious merit. Implicit in the concept of dharma as duty is
the idea of relation, particularly in the form of duty to others.
The specifics of one’s birth, such as gender and caste, are
reflected in an individual’s understanding of their and others’
dharma. A common linguistic contraction is jatidharma,
the “duty of one’s caste” or “the duty of one’s gender.” The
concept of jatidharma presumes that individuals and groups
have different duties and responsibilities, and fulfilling those
responsibilities brings honor to oneself and the family. Thus,
dharma is understood as “duty according to one’s social
place.” It is important to note that jatidharma distinctions
are not inherently stratifying or hierarchical; they only
become so through people’s claims to power and authority
through repetitious and everyday practices of dominance,
subordination and resistance. During riti maagnay Dalits
claim that it is a riti’s dharma to give them what they are
asking for. Such moral expectations are further reinforced by
Dalits’ descriptions of their poverty-driven suffering.
The dukkha (suffering) of being Dalit in Bajhang is linked to
the concept of dharma; there is inevitable suffering associated
with certain positions and situations in life. Individuals
experiencing social and economic hardship may feel it is
the unfolding of their karma to be experiencing pain, and
that the fate of being from a stigmatized social group vastly
exacerbates that situation. Experiences of situational dukkha
arising from one’s karma can be alleviated by looking to
external sources to help alleviate the suffering, be it healers
for illness, shamans for emotional distress, or landowning riti
for economic need. The community strongly values listening
to another person’s experiences of suffering; referencing one’s
dukkha in the riti maagnay context expands the interaction
between people to areas of emotional intensity involving
compassion. When a bhagya confronts a reluctant riti he
reminds her of the religious merit, dharma, gained through
giving.11 The bhagya tries to appeal to the sympathy of the
riti by describing his current situation of dukkha - a spouse is
gone, a child is ill, an adult family member is unable to work,
the cows are not giving milk, or there is insufficient money
for a marriage. By expressing his dukkha, the Dalit artisan
gives the riti an opportunity to make life temporarily easier

for him by giving generously. In turn, the riti reaps the merit
and power from giving.
The Right to Work
Fundamentally, the work that Dalits reliably perform for
riti families supports their rightful claim to khalo and other
things. The inter caste agreements between families entitle and
obligate both sides to be the preferred employer and employee
to each other. The moral obligation to work and to employ is
quite strong in Bajhang, and has kept families in production
relationships with one another over several generations. In
the agricultural economy, landowning riti should ask for
artisan products and labor first from their bhagya families.
Indeed, landholding families are very reluctant to purchase
tools, baskets, pottery and other artisan and farming services
directly from a non-bhagya, much preferring to draw on the
relationship they have with bhagya families, even if it may
cost more in regular large and frequent small “payments.” The
riti can rely on bhagya to deliver goods regularly and timely,
and they can ask bhagya family members to work at any
time. Third, from the riti’s perspective, an important social
relationship is maintained that they believe ensures their
continued economic, social, and political dominance.
The Right to Receive: Harvest Shares and Everyday
Needs
Community members believe it is the right of Dalits to
request food and other necessities from Brahman-Chhetri
ritis; doing so sustains them through lean periods and
temporarily soothes the hardships of their poverty. As a
group, the Dalits of Bajhang expect fair payment in exchange
for services rendered, and they make it known widely if they
suspect they have been cheated by their ritis. Dalit artisans and
laborers will delay or refuse to complete important farming or
other work until the payment matter is resolved, a situation
they raise as an issue during riti maagnay discussions. They
therefore characterize their relationship with landowning riti
primarily as one of asymmetrical economic reciprocity, rather
than in kinship terms, as Raheja (1990) has suggested.
The largest request made in the agricultural cycle is for
khalo, the semi-annual harvest shares of rice and wheat that
may also include other grains such as corn, millet, lentils
and soybeans.12 Khalo is considered payment for work
completed and a down-payment on relationship continuity.
Khalo payments in Bajhang are mainly based on the value
of the commodity produced or service rendered, though
other considerations such as number of dependents, the
sex of the laborers (men’s work is paid more than women’s
work), imminent and costly weddings, and illness are also
factored into khalo shares.13 A bhagya with many riti can
amass substantially more khalo in a season than a bhagya
with no riti. Indeed, the poorest Dalit households are those
with few to no riti, and the relatively wealthier ones have
many. The communal obligation to pay bhagya may produce
a surplus from khalo for Dalit bhagya families with many

workers, extensive riti networks, and highly valued products.
Although khalo is considered a payment for services rendered,
the bhagya must walk to the threshing floor or the riti’s house
to obtain it. In addition to khalo shares, all Dalit families with
riti bhagya ties request food and other material goods from
their patrons throughout the year, as Durga is described as
doing in the introduction.14

Asking
The strategies employed by Dalits to achieve their desired
exchange goals include selecting auspicious days and times
to make requests; using gestures and symbols of subservience
and dominance; engaging in mutually enjoyable conversation
about family, crops, politics, and village events; mixing
pleading and indignant tones; shaming the riti into giving
more than a meager amount; explicitly asserting one’s
rightful claim to desired objects; using linguistic minimizers
to convey openness and vagueness; appealing to values of
religious merit and duty to those who suffer; and disputing
riti’s assertions that they are undeserving.
Cultural Time: Auspiciousness and Dosh Maanay
Like many consequential actions in Hindu communities, the
practice of riti maagnay is believed by the people of Bajhang to
be most fruitful if undertaken during auspicious time, or shubha
bela, and avoided during inauspicious time, or ashubha or dosh
bela. By auspicious is meant the appropriate connection of
time and temporal events in relation to particular categories of
places, objects, and persons (Madan 1985:12-13).3 Auspicious
times are determined astrologically, according to the phases
of the moon, days of the week, and the time of day based on
planetary alignment. They also may be determined by ritual
events surrounding life passages such as births and deaths,
as well as phases of the agricultural cycle. Auspiciousness
involves space, time, people, and objects which, if connected
in proper and appropriate ways, bear well-being, happiness,
health, and balance. Dalits often evaluate the auspiciousness
of plans to riti magné, connecting their moral right to ask for
objects with their cultural knowledge of appropriate timing.
The practice of avoiding inauspicious times to undertake
action is called dosh manay, to “observe the inauspiciousness”
of certain times and actions, and to avoid activities during
those times. The effect of dosh would be to render attempts to
receive objects fruitless; many Dalits will not approach riti to
ask for things if they consider the time to be inauspicious to
either themselves or to their riti. There is not strict conformity
to dosh mane among all Dalit families and groups. The women
I know in a Damai family observe dosh based on the riti’s
situation and not based on their own family situation, while
others will consider the auspiciousness of both families.
Finally, the Baadi apply the most complex grid of dosh mane to
their magné practices. They do not magnu on days in which the
moon is in an inauspicious phase, for example purnima (full
moon), aunsi (no moon), sankranti (first day of the month),
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masanti (last day of month), and ekadashi (eleventh day after
aunsi). Also, if the riti is inside the house eating they will not
magné because the patron will not give. If the bar (day) is
good but the riti is placing a fresh coat of mud-plaster on the
walls of the house - a practice called lipnay that is associated
with the auspiciousness of a religious or lunar event - they
will not magné because the riti will not give on such days,
either. Other days deemed inauspicious by the Baadi are
Maagh tihar, utraini and shatraini (inauspicious planetary
alignments), and sraddha (death anniversary of both the riti
and the bhagya’s ancestors).
The most important times to request one’s khalo share are
the rice and wheat harvest months of Kartik (mid-October
through mid-November 15) and Jeth (mid-May through midJune 15), especially while the crop is being harvested in the
field. If the month progresses without the bhagya initiating
requests, she or he may not receive khalo until months later;
once the harvest is stored the bhagya must wait until the riti
themselves have eaten from the new grain stores. Riti maagnay,
then, is not a series of spontaneous events initiated at will by
bhagya. Rather, the practice incorporates a rightful claim to
ask high caste owner cultivators for subsistence needs, and
they are framed by moral ideas about appropriate action taken
at auspicious times.

Linguistic Strategies
Dalits who initiate requests for food and non food items
convey their right and/or their need to receive the desired
object, while landowners want to at least initially avoid
giving to Dalits by either ignoring the request, giving as little
as possible, and/or demanding they receive something (or
the promise of something) in return. Competing objectives
therefore engage both parties in a dialogue that co-constructs
what it means to be a Dalit who seeks and to be a non Dalit
who gives.
Minimizing and Shaming
A linguistic strategy effectively used by Dalit bhagya in riti
maagnay is minimizing, a form of conventional indirectness
that serves to make the request appear modest yet necessary.
Minimizing some feature of the request – the amount, the
item, and/or the person himself - facilitates negotiation and
compromise between the parties, thus giving Dalits a modicum
of temporary control over the situation. The vagueness of
minimizers follows norms of interaction that discourage lower
status persons (Dalits and women, for example) from making
direct demands on higher status persons. The expectation
of future reciprocity and the real belief that Dalits have in
the rightness of their claims, both support the request as a
demand. Habermas notes this function of language when
he observes the following: “... when certain social roles
prescribe that commands be uttered in the form of requests,
the pragmatic meaning of the utterance (as a command) in
no way alters the linguistic meaning of the sentence (as a
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request)” (1979: 45). Such linguistic strategies are common in
asymmetric speech acts. For Dalits, demonstrating linguistic
agency can counter positions of dominance by persons of socalled higher caste. Once the request for an object is established
through this initial contact the exchange proceeds with the
mutual understanding that the desired object is negotiable.
Dalit and Brahman-Chhetri alike should then demonstrate a
willingness to negotiate in a friendly and fair way.
Agentic Dalit strategy in riti magné is found also in shaming
the riti. Though a Dalit may minimize her request, she
anticipates that the donor will provide more than a small
amount. If that does not happen, Dalits will ridicule or reject
a small offering and demand more. Numerous times I have
observed Dalits either reluctantly accept the item-donation,
complaining that it is insufficient, or the donation is outright
rejected and the supplicant begins to walk away in disgust.
One late afternoon in January, 1989, for example, the wife
of an ironsmith (Luharni) stopped by the house of a Thakuri
family I was visiting in Bajhang, taking a break from fieldwork
to discuss their daughter’s education. Luharni politely asked
her female riti for some salt and spices to cook her family’s
evening meal. The Thakuri riti gave her a couple of dried
red peppers but no salt. The ironsmith’s wife refused to
take the small dried plants that had been set on the ground,
exclaiming loud enough for others to hear, “How lobhi [selfish]
you are! This amount is not worth anything for cooking. And
you don’t have a small amount of salt?” She began to walk
away as the Thakuri woman told her “Wait, sister, I’ll get a
bit more for you. You don’t have to be angry.” Such responses
to a riti who is being less than generous are very effective, for
people in this cooperative farming community do not want
to earn reputations of being greedy and selfish. The use of
shame by accusing the rich Thakuri landowner accusations
of selfishness was effective in persuading the riti to be more
generous.
Or take the case of Paru Damai, a tailor who came to a
Brahman family’s house one morning in December, 1994, as
I finished eating a rice meal as their guest. He needed rice
for his own meal that morning, as the women in the family
were either ill (his elderly wife), menstruating and therefore
ritually impure to cook food (his older daughter-in-law), or in
a distant field working for another riti (his youngest daughterin-law). Paru’s family had sewn and repaired clothing for
the extended Brahman family for four generations and his
right to make food requests outside the harvest season was
indisputable. Still, as the head of a poor family, Paru was
vulnerable to riti caprice. That morning he asked: “Hajur, may
I have a handful of chamal [husked rice] for our breakfast this
morning?” “How much do you need?” the Brahmani replied.
“Oh, just a small amount” and he gestured with a cupped
hand to indicate the meager amount. He was eventually given
a small amount, to which he replied it was not enough, asking
rhetorically how that could ever feed a family of seven. After
about an hour of negotiation, Paru left with the equivalent of
about two pounds (two maana) of husked rice, far more than

the small handful he had originally requested.
Chitta bujnay: To be satisfied
Both parties understand that satisfied desires, chita bhujnay,
are the goal of riti maagnay. Dalits do not expect to get exactly
what they came for, but they will not leave until a modicum of
satisfaction is realized. Landowners, in turn, typically begin
the negotiation with an immediate refusal of the request, but
will eventually find it in their interest to capitulate. They are
persuaded to act meritoriously (or appear to be acting so),
they value a future work commitment, and they want the
solicitation to end.

Conclusions: Comprehensive Social
Justice
The contribution of Dalit artisans and workers to the
village economy is indisputable. Yet they participate in
economic formations not always of their own choosing, as
evident in their attempts to seek economic independence
by acquiring land on the local market, and their on-going
material demands from Brahman-Chhetri landowners. The
above ‘ethnography of the particular’ hoped to convey also a
sense of Dalit agency in challenging caste discrimination in a
form distinct from the challenge to caste oppression offered
by Dalit political activists. The communicative agency of riti
magné incorporates linguistic schemas and strategies in which
the merits of an initial request are debated using persuasion
and influence, shaming and supplication, and where power
differences between the castes are challenged. To participate
in riti maagnay is to perpetuate Brahman-Chhetri domination
in a fundamental way, but also to resist, deny, and render
ambiguous and contestable such domination by applying
discursive techniques embodying alternative community
values of mutual obligation, cooperation, friendliness and
generosity. Rural Dalit agency brings to the fore and contests
the forms of discrimination and oppression importantly
evoked in the debate over the term “Dalit” by political
activists, a debate that nonetheless fails to acknowledge the
economic dependency of Dalits on non Dalits and the former’s
evolved ability to adjust to and live with respect under those
conditions.
I believe it is the nuances of inter caste relationships that
will bear significantly on the forms social justice in Nepal
will take. Broad gestures of reform will be ineffective if
urban legislators fail to consider sources of Dalit power
and sources of their dependence on Brahman-Chhetri
landowners. If those legislators do not actively address rural
economic interdependence (and there is growing concern
by nepaldalitinfo.com participants that the Constituent
Assembly representatives may be less activist and more pawns
of political parties), there may be unintended consequences of
severing traditional ties in ways that could negatively impact
rural Dalits, as one close observer on the ground notes.15
An example of the consequences of ignoring rural Dalit

realities in the wake of social reforms in Nepal can be found
in the case of family property inheritance reform. Until
recently, Dalit women inherited property in the same way
as non Dalit women, that is, through males and primarily
through husbands after marriage. Most Dalit families own
little to no land, and what women inherit, then, are economic
relationships associated with riti-bhagya ties, like the right to
work for landowners in exchange for harvest shares and other
material goods described above. Under new family property
inheritance laws, however, women have the right to inherit
land and other property equal to brothers. Consequently, Dalit
women’s main source of economic stability – landowners’
land on which they labor as a right they inherit through their
husband’s family – is potentially destabilized as land becomes
divided among daughters and sons equally. As the problem of
landowning daughters’ property inheritance after marriage
(when daughters typically move away from the natal home)
has been widely discussed as a potential barrier to women
claiming their new property rights, problems associated with
Dalit women’s inheritance (such as the unlikelihood she
could inherit rights to work from her father’s riti, or that the
land of her husband’s riti might be reduced by landowner
daughters’ inheritance) have been ignored, most likely due to
a lack of understanding by legislators and party leaders about
rural Dalit women’s situation.
The social dimensions of rural economic exchange like
riti maagnay must be considered as the people and the
government of Nepal move forward with eliminating castebased inequality. My argument here has been that such
complexities remain unintentionally unacknowledged in
the quest for an emergent Dalit identity that tends to focus
on historical trajectories of injustice and abstract ideas of
political representation, and less on local economic realities
and community values. An important question that flows
from recognition of rural agricultural realities in mixed caste
communities would be how best to replace the in-kind and
moral economy in artisan and farming relations with forms
of fair payment to artisans. As we have seen, negotiation is
a central theme in riti maagnay, suggesting that Dalits feel
they are not fairly compensated, and that they therefore
must measure compensation beyond a simple employment
calculation. It is difficult to verify if, indeed, there is an equal
exchange of pay for work. Furthermore, the moral dimension
of exchange – that those with more should give to those
with less – suggests that the communities involved regard
entitlement claims as valid. Will the government of Nepal
be able to replace the agency informed by moral judgment
and community standards with legalistic fair employment
practices that can be enforced? Will Dalits be provided
sufficient incentives to opt out of the inherited system and to
participate in a free market labor economy, risking the loss
of a safety net during times of dukkha? Could Dalits become
landowners and subsistence farmers, in numbers equivalent
to their non Dalit counterparts? Land reform has not always
helped Dalits, due to corruption and fraud by non Dalits
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and due to Dalit unwillingness to settle on land far from the
reliable, though potentially exploitative, riti bhagya system.
Can the government of Nepal provide to Dalits an economic
safety-net now provided by landowners? Such questions
must be considered in achieving economic justice for Dalit
families.
Finally, the question of social justice remains. The efficacy
of a modern political identity, while partially realized in
the work of donor agencies and abstract Constitutional
representation, belies the criminal justice system’s abysmal
record of protecting Dalits from caste-based crimes. It is widely
recognized, and a source of continuous frustration for those
working on behalf of Dalits, that the laws against caste-based
discrimination are not enforced. Weekly reports of abuse and
violence against Dalits are inevitably accompanied by reports
of a weak police investigation, or of no investigation at all.
Indeed, the staff at FEDO (Feminist Dalit Organization) and
other Dalit NGOs spend enormous time and effort publicly
protesting noncompliance to Nepal’s laws, and resorting
to legal action themselves. Responding to this need, many
Dalit development projects involve educational programs
specifically geared toward informing Dalits of their civil and
legal rights.
What we should conclude is that as Nepal progresses from a
period of violence to a state of hard-fought political equality,
only a comprehensive approach toward social justice involving
economic, civil, and educational rights will be acceptable to
Dalit communities.
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Endnotes
1. A scene composed from field observations in Bajhang recorded
during the years 1978-2001.
2. The figures for Nepal’s Dalit population vary widely and are a
source of controversy. The government itself uses different figures
in the same year from its own census reports, depending on the context, and they are widely regarded as too low. Dalit NGO Federation
conducted its own census in 2003 and found the population to be
around 23%. I thank D.B. Bishwakarma for this information (email
communication March 5, 2008).
3. I would like to credit this last point to discussions with Dr.
Drona Rasali.
4. In Bajhang the practice relates to what is locally called riti
bhagya or rithi bhage (depending on local dialects), translated as the
“tradition of receiving harvest shares,” a term that over time has
also come to refer to the people involved, such that rithi refers to
landowners who are usually of elite caste and others (ethnic minorities and other dalits, for example) for whom Dalit artisans, referred
to as bhagya, work. As described later, these are inherited economic
relationships. Riti bhagya or rithi bhage is a term used primarily in
Seti and Mahakali Zones. In other regions of Nepal the relationship
goes by different names such as balighare pratha. In this article I retain the term riti bhagya commonly used in Bajhang when referring
to both the custom of economic interdependence and to the people
themselves.
5. See Hangen 2005 on the political identity of ethnic minority
groups in Nepal.
6. I thank Mr. Motilal Nepali, Chair of Dalit NGO Federation
- Nepal and Dalit Welfare Association, and Mr. DB Sagar Bishwakarma, President, International Commission for Dalit Rights (ICDR),
for assisting me with information on Dalit NGOs in Nepal.
7. The most famous Nepali to use the surname Bishwokarma was
former Minister Hira Lal Bishwokarma. Before him, though, many
Nepali Dalits had registered their surnames as Bishwokarma (and
other versions) (email correspondence Om Prakash VK, 7-28-07).
8. The enormously important contribution that Dalit artisans
make to the local economy can be seen in Table 4 of Cameron (1998,
pp. 33-34), that lists the functional and aesthetic products produced
by Bajhangi Dalit artisans.
9. Evidence from Palpa District in western Nepal suggests that
this ethos may be absent and that Dalits routinely feel exploited
by landholding families for whom they work and from whom they
receive less than adequate payment (email correspondence, DB
Bishwakarma, 7-8-2007).
10. Relations of domination between non Dalits over Dalits are
the focus of early studies on South Asian culture, including Berreman 1979, Borgstrom 1980, Briggs 1975, Freeman 1979, Galanter
1972, Hofer 1979, Khare 1984, Lynch 1969, Mencher 1974, and
Miller 1966, 1969.
11. The concept of dharma, defined as religion and religious or
meritorious duty based on one’s relative social position, is central
to Hindu ideology and popular Hindu culture (Allen 1982; Daniel
1984; Fruzzetti 1982; Khare 1976; Inden and Nicholas 1977; Kolenda 1982; Madan 1982).
12. Due to the scarcity of grain among Dalit families, their pay-
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ments to other Dalit riti are in the form of exchanges of services or
commodities, rather than grains.
13. Lohar ironsmiths (Kami) receive the largest khalo per family
because their tool-making work is vital to the agricultural economy
and is considered physically demanding. Sarki, Parki, and Oudh
receive smaller khalo and have fewer riti families. The value of the
Sarki’s leatherworking has greatly diminished in the past few decades because of local preferences for imported plastic goods such as
sandals from other parts of Nepal or India. Parki and Oudh receive
smaller khalo shares because the Parki’s bamboo products and the
Oudh’s masonry skills are not in regular demand. In my research I
found that the greatest total amount of khalo was given to the Badi
because all Brahman-Chhetri families feel obliged to give to them.
The Badi do no farming for themselves or for anyone else and are

Blacksmith family from Syara,
Humla district, Nepal
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completely dependent on the generosity of the Brahman-Chhetri.
14. Of the different artisan groups in Bajhang, the Badi most
broadly interpret their riti duty to them, and constantly request
grains, lentils, spices, salt, money, cigarettes, and even alcohol, in
exchange for what many perceive to be minimal services rendered
as entertainers and potters.
15. Peter Burleigh (former Ambassador and Deputy Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador to Sri Lanka and the Republic of Maldives, official in the U.S. embassies in Nepal, Bahrain,
India, and Sri Lanka, and former Peace Corps volunteer in Nepal)
recently informed me of this possible development, in his current
role as Nepal election observer for the Carter Center (email communication March 4, 2008).
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